Abstract: The stable matching problem (also known as stable marriage problem) is a 1 well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not 2 married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical 3 applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students 4 to schools or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical stable marriage 5 problem, both men and women express a strict preference order over the members of the 6 other sex, in a qualitative way. Here we consider stable marriage problems with weighted 7 preferences: each man (resp., woman) provides a score for each woman (resp., man). Such 8 problems are more expressive than the classical stable marriage problems. Moreover, in 9 some real-life situations it is more natural to express scores (to model, for example, profits 10 or costs) rather than a qualitative preference ordering. In this context, we define new notions 11 of stability and optimality, and we provide algorithms to find marriages which are stable 12 and/or optimal according to these notions. While expressivity greatly increases by adopting 13 weighted preferences, we show that in most cases the desired solutions can be found by 14 adapting existing algorithms for the classical stable marriage problem. We also consider 
Introduction
has led to intensive studies of the computational properties of manipulation for a variety of voting 140 rules with complete and incomplete preferences [9, 27, 28, 32, 34, 44] . This study could be very useful 141 to develop new stable marriage procedures, which are based on voting rules that are computationally 142 difficult to manipulate. Results in this direction have been shown in [33, 35] , where it is shown that it is 143 computationally difficult to decide if an agent can manipulate the lexicographical minimal regret stable 144 marriage procedure both when such a procedure is based on the hybrid plurality rule and when it is based 145 on the STV rule. 
Background

147
We now give some basic notions on various stable marriage problems. case of classical stable marriage problem (SM), a profile is a sequence of strict total orders. Given a SM 156 P , there may be many stable marriages for P . However, it is interesting to know that there is always Algorithm 1: GS Set all men and women as free while there is a free man m do w ← the first woman in pref (m) to which he has not yet proposed if w is free then match m with w if m > pref (w) z, where z is w's current partner then match m with w and set z free else w rejects m and m remains free
Stable marriage problems with partially ordered preferences
177
In SMs, each preference ordering is a strict total order over the members of the other sex. More 178 general notions of SMs allow preference orderings to be partial [15, 16, 25, 30] . This allows for the 179 modelling of both indifference (via ties) and incomparability (via absence of ordering) between members
180
of the other sex. In this context, a stable marriage problem is defined by a sequence of 2n partial orders,
181
n over the men and n over the women. We will denote with SMP a stable marriage problem with such 182 partially ordered preferences. Given an SMP, we will sometimes use the notion of a linearization of such could be to use a topological order on the underlying DAG representing the partial order.
188
A marriage M for an SMP is said to be weakly-stable if it does not contain blocking pairs. for man m (resp., woman w) of woman w (resp., man m) will be denoted by p(m, w) (resp., p(w, m)).
200
Example 1 Let {w 1 , w 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } be respectively the set of women and men. An instance of an
201
SMW is the following: {m 1 : w
1 > w [1] 2 (i.e., man m 1 prefers woman w 1 to woman w 2 , and he prefers 202 w 1 with value 9 and w 2 with value 1), m 2 : w
numbers written into the round brackets identify the preference values.
We will introduce new notions of stability and optimality for SMWs that have not been considered in
205
[26] and we will show how to find them by adapting the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm for SMs. 
214
• m prefers w to his partner in M , say w , by at least α (i.e., p(m, w) − p(m, w ) ≥ α),
215
• w prefers m to her partner in M , say m , by at least α (i.e., p(w, m) − p(w, m ) ≥ α).
216
A marriage is α-stable if it does not contain α-blocking pairs. A man m (resp., woman w) is α-feasible 217 for woman w (resp., man m) if m is married with w in some α-stable marriage. 
Relations with classical stability notions
219
Given an SMW P , let us denote with c(P ), the classical SM problem obtained from P by considering partners better than all the feasible ones according to the classical notion of stability. I α (P ) the set of 224 the α-stable marriages of P and with I(c(P )) the set of the stable marriages of c(P ).
225
Proposition 1 Given an SMW P , and a natural number α with α ≥ 1, if α = 1, I α (P ) = I(c(P )), and
227
Given an SMP P , the set of α-stable marriages of P contains the set of stable marriages of c(P ), since 228 the α-blocking pairs of P are a subset of the blocking pairs of c(P ).
229
Let us denote with α(P ) the stable marriage problem with incomparable pairs obtained from an SMW
230
P by setting as incomparable every pair of people that don't differ for at least α, and with I w (α(P )) the 231 set of the weakly stable marriages of α(P ). It is possible to show that the set of the weakly stable 232 marriages of α(P ) coincides with the set of the α-stable marriages of P . This means that, given an 233 SMW P , every algorithm that is able to find a weakly stable marriage for α(P ) provides an α-stable 234 marriage for P .
235
Theorem 1 Given an SMW P , I α (P ) = I w (α(P )).
236
Proof: We first show that I α (P ) ⊆ I w (α(P )). Assume that a marriage M ∈ I w (α(P )), we now show
, then there is a pair (man,woman), say (m, w), in α(P ) such that m prefers w to his partner in M , say w , and w prefers m to her partner in M , say m . By definition of 239 α(P ), this means that m prefers w to w by at least degree α and w prefers m to m by at least degree 240 α in P , and so M ∈ I α (P ). Similarly, we can show that I α (P ) ⊇ I w (α(P )). In fact, if M ∈ I α (P ),
241
then there is a pair (man,woman), say (m, w), in P such that m prefers w to w by at least degree α and
242
w prefers m to m by at least degree α. By definition of α(P ), this means that m prefers w to w and w 243 prefers m to m in α(P ) and so M ∈ I w (α(P )), i.e., M is not a weakly stable marriage for α(P ).
244
Example 2 Assume that α is 2. Let us consider the following instance of an SMW, say P : {m 1 : w
2 }. The set of the α-stable marriages of P ,
246
that coincides with the set of the weakly stable marriages of α(P ), by Theorem 1, contains the following
On the other hand, not all stable marriage problems with partially ordered preferences can be 249 expressed as stable marriage problems with weighted preferences such that the stable marriages in the 250 two problems coincide. More precisely, given any SMP problem P , we would like to be able to generate 251 a corresponding SMW problem P and a value α such that, in P , the weights of elements ordered in
252
P differ more than α, while those of elements that are incomparable in P differ less than α. Consider
253
for example the case of a partial order over six elements, defined as follows: 
Dominance and lex-male-optimality
258
We recall that in SMPs a weakly-stable marriage dominates another weakly-stable marriage if men 259 are happier (or equally happy) and there is at least a man that is strictly happier. The same holds for 260 α-stable marriages.
when the most popular men are as happy as possible and they are married with their most popular best 275 α-feasible women 1 . To compute a strict ordering on the men where the most popular men (resp., the most 276 popular women) are ranked first, we follow a reasoning similar to the one considered in [33, 35] , that is,
277
we apply a voting rule [4] to the preferences given by the women (resp., by the men). More precisely,
278
such a voting rule takes in input the preference values given by the women over the men (resp., given by 279 the men over the women) and returns a strict total order over the men (resp., women).
280
Definition 3 (lex-male-optimal) Consider an SMW P , a natural number α, and a voting rule r. Let 281 us denote with o m (resp., o w ) the strict total order over the men (resp., over the women) computed by 282 applying r to the preference values that the women give to the men (resp., the men give to the women).
283
An α-stable marriage M is lex-male-optimal w.r.t. o m and o w , if, for every other α-stable marriage M ,
284
the following conditions hold:
285
• there is a man
286
• for every man
287
Proposition 2 Given an SMW P , a strict total ordering o m (resp., o w ) over the men (resp., women),
288
• there is a unique lex-male-optimal α-stable marriage w.r.t. o m and o w , say L.
289
• L may be different from the male-optimal stable marriage of c(P );
290
• if α(P ) has a unique undominated weakly stable marriage, say L , then L coincides with L ,
291
otherwise L is one of the undominated weakly stable marriages of α(P ). It is possible to find optimal α-stable marriages by adapting the Gale-Shapely algorithm. Given an
294
SMW P and a natural number α, by Theorem 1, to find an α-stable marriage it is sufficient to find a 295 weakly stable marriage of α(P ). This can be done by applying the GS algorithm to any linearization 296 of α(P ). Given an SMW P , a natural number α, and two orderings o m and o w over men and women
297
computed by applying a voting rule to P as described in Definition 3, it is possible to find the α-stable 298 marriage that is lex-male-optimal w.r.t o m and o w by applying the GS algorithm to the linearization of 299 α(P ) where we order incomparable pairs, i.e., the pairs that differ for less than α in P , in accordance 300 with the orderings o m and o w .
301
Proposition 3 Given an SMW P , a natural number α, o m (resp., o w ) an ordering over the men (resp., 302 women), algorithm Lex-male-α-stable-GS returns the lex-male-optimal α-stable marriage of P w.r. at the happiness of the pairs (man,woman) rather than at the happiness of the members of a single sex.
311
A way to define the strength of the link of two people is the following.
312
Definition 4 (link additive-strength) Given a man m and a woman w, the link additive-strength of the 313 pair (m, w), denoted by la(m, w), is the value obtained by summing the preference value that m gives 314 to w and the preference value that w gives to m, i.e., la(m, w) = p(m, w) + p(w, m).
315
Notice that we can use other operators beside the sum to define the link strength of a pair, such as, for 316 example, the maximum, the minimum, or the product.
317
Definition 5 (additive-weight) Given a marriage M , the additive-weight of M , denoted by w a (M ), is 318 the sum of the links of all its pairs, i.e., {(m,w)∈M } la(m, w).
319
We now give a notion of stability that exploits the definition of the link additive-strength given above. it does not contain link-additive-blocking pairs.
326
Example 4 Let {w 1 , w 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } be, respectively, the set of women and men. Consider 327 the following instance of an SMW, P : {m 1 : w such a marriage has an additive-weight higher than the male-optimal stable marriage of c(P ) that 331 is M 2 = {(m 1 , w 2 ), (m 2 , w 1 )} which has additive-weight w a (M 2 ) = 13 + 10 = 23.
332
Link-stability applies anytime there is an incentive to break a partnership to create a new one with an 333 overall larger cumulative worth. This is certainly desirable as it leads to stronger positions in investments 334 or it applies in the case where the benefit will depend on the overall contribution of both partners but 335 will for example benefit a third party. Another motivation is that of considering a man and a women as he/she will put less resources but that has a higher overall number of resources available. 
Relations with other stability notions
344
Given an SMW P , let us denote with Linka(P ) the stable marriage problem with ties obtained from
Proposition 5 Given an SMW P , if Linka(P ) has no ties, then there is a unique link-additive-stable 367 marriage with the highest additive-weight.
368
If the link strength of a pair is computed by using the maximum of the scores, rather than the sum of the 
404
Algorithm 3: Max-link-max Input: P : an SMW with n men {m 1 , . . . , m n } and n women {w 1 , . . . , w n } Output: µ: a marriage µ ← ∅ M ← {(m i , w j ), for i, j = 1, . . . , n} while M = ∅ do (m * , w * ) ← the pair of M with the maximum link-max strength;
Additive-weight
425
We assume now to compute the link of a marriage as the sum of the links of all its pairs. First, we will 426 show how to find the link-additive stable marriage with the highest additive-weight for some classes of 427 SMWs (i.e., for SMWs P such that Linka(P ) has no ties) and then we will show a procedure that can 428 be used for any class of SMWs. By Proposition 2, we know that the set of the link-additive-stable (resp.,
429
link-maximal-stable) marriages of an SMW P coincides with the set of the weakly stable marriages of the 430 SMP Linka(P ) (resp., Linkm(P )). Therefore, to find a link-additive-stable (resp., link-maximal-stable) 431 marriage, we can simply apply algorithm GS to a linearization of Linka(P ) (resp., Linkm(P )).
432
Algorithm 4: link-additive-stable-GS (resp., link-maximal-stable-GS) Input: P : an SMW Output: µ: a marriage P ← Linka(P ) (resp., Linkm(P )); P ← a linearization of P ; µ ← the marriage obtained by applying GS algorithm to P ; return µ Proposition 9 Given an SMW P , the marriage returned by algorithm link-additive-stable-GS (link-433 maximal-stable-GS) over P , say M , is link-additive-stable (resp., link-maximal-stable). Moreover, if
434
there are not ties in Linka(P ) (resp., Linkm(P )), M is link-additive-stable (resp., link-maximal-stable) 435 and it has the highest additive-weight.
436
When there are no ties in Linka(P ) (resp., Linkm(P )), the marriage returned by algorithm link-437 additive-stable-GS (resp., link-maximal-stable-GS) is male-optimal w.r. that are all different and we consider the notion of link-maximal-stability.
442
Proposition 10 Given an SMW P where the preference values are all different, the marriage returned 443 by algorithm link-maximal-stable-GS algorithm over P is link-maximal-stable and it has the highest 444 additive-weight.
445
When instead there are ties in Linka(P ) (resp., Link(P )), to find the link-additive stable marriage 446 with the highest additive-weight in SMWs P , we cannot use Algorithm Max-link-max since it may not 447 return the marriage with the highest additive-weight, as shown in the following example.
448
Example 5 Let {w 1 , w 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } be, respectively, the set of women and men. Consider the 449 following instance P of an SMW: {m 1 : w to (resp., better than) f (p) for w.
495
W-manipulation for α-stability
We first assume that the agents know the value of α. We show that, when using weights, agents can 497 manipulate by just modifying the weights.
498
Theorem 3 Let α be any natural number > 1. Every procedure which returns an α-stable matching is 499 w-manipulable, and there is at least one procedure which is strictly w-manipulable.
500
Proof: Let {w 1 , w 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } be, respectively, the set of women and men. Consider the following 501 instance of an SMW, say P ,
502
• m 1 : w Theorem 3 (where we replace every α with α max ) holds. Thus every procedure is still w-manipulable,
532
and some are also strictly w-manipulable. Also, restricting to at most one tie per agent will not avoid 533 w-manipulation, since again the same example holds.
534
The most promising case is when agents have no information about α. In this case, we need to define 535 what it means for a procedure to be manipulable.
536
Definition 11 (α-w-manipulable) A procedure which returns an α-stable matching is α-w-manipulable 537 if it is w-manipulable for all α and it is strictly w-manipulable for at least one α.
538
Theorem 4 There is a procedure which returns an α-stable matching which is α-w-manipulable.
539
Proof: Let {w 1 , w 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } be, respectively, the set of women and men. Consider the following 540 instance of an SMW, P : {m 1 : w
2 }. For 541 every α, P has two α-stable matchings:
When α = 1, M 2 is strictly better than M 1 for w 1 in P , while when α > 1, M 2 is equally preferred to 543 M 1 for w 1 in P . Assume that w 1 mis-reports her preferences as follows:
1 . Let us denote 544 with P the problem obtained from P by using this mis-reported preference for w 1 . When α ∈ {1, 2},
545
M 2 is strictly better than M 1 for w 1 in P , while when α > 2, M 2 is equally preferred to M 1 for w 1 in 546 P . Let us consider a procedure, that we call mGS, which works as the Gale-Shapley algorithm over all 547 the profiles except on P and P , where it works as follows: if a matching is strictly better than another 548 matching in terms of α for w 1 , then it returns the best one, while if a matching is equally preferred to 549 another matching in terms of α for w 1 , then it returns the worst one for w 1 w.r.t. the strict preference 550 ordering induced by the weights. Therefore, when α = 1, mGS returns M 2 in both P and P , when 551 α = 2 mGS returns M 1 in P and M 2 in P , while when α > 2 mGS returns M 1 in both P and P .
552
Therefore, if w 1 lies, for every α, he obtains a partner that is better than or equal to the one obtained by 553 telling the truth, and there is a value α (i.e., α=2) where he obtains a partner that is better than the one 554 obtained by telling the truth. Therefore, the mGS procedure is α-w-manipulable.
555
As in the case when α is known, we may consider restricting to profiles with at most one tie per agent.
556
However, the example in the above proof satisfies this restriction, so it shows that α-w-manipulability is 557 possible also with such a severe restriction.
558
It is also possible to give a stronger result which is based on the following notion of manipulation.
559
Definition 12 (α-strictly-w-manipulable) A procedure which returns an α-stable matching is α-560 strictly-w-manipulable if it is strictly w-manipulable for all α.
561
Theorem 5 There is a procedure which returns an α-stable matching which is α-strictly-w-manipulable.
562
Proof: Let {w 1 , w 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } be, respectively, the set of women and men. Consider the following 563 instance of an SMW, P , {m 1 : w
2 }. For 564 every α, P has two α-stable matchings:
Assume that w 1 mis-reports her preferences as follows:
1 . Let us denote with P the 566 problem obtained from P by using this mis-reported preference for w 1 .
567
Let us consider a procedure, that we call newGS, which works as the Gale-Shapley algorithm over all 568 the profiles except on P and P , where it works as follows: for every α, it returns M 1 in P and M 2 in P .
569
Therefore, if w 1 lies, for every α, he obtains a partner that is better than to the one obtained by telling 570 the truth. Therefore, the newGS procedure is α-strictly-w-manipulable.
571
We may consider restricting to profiles with the same weight for all top choices with at most one tie 572 per agent. However, the example in the above proof satisfies this restriction, so it shows that α-strictly-573 w-manipulability is possible also with such a severe restriction. Every procedure for link-additive stability is strictly w-manipulable.
576
Theorem 6 Every procedure that returns a link-additive stable matching is strictly w-manipulable.
577
Proof: Let {w 1 , w 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } be, respectively, the set of women and men. Consider the following 578 instance of an SMW, say P : {m 1 : w [6] 2 > w
2 }.
579
P has a unique link-additive stable matching, which is M 1 = {(m 1 , w 2 ), (m 2 , w 1 )}. Assume that w 1 580 mis-reports her preferences as follows:
2 . Then, in the new problem, that we call P ,
581
there is only one stable matching, which is M 2 = {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 )}, and M 2 is better than M 1 for 582 w 1 in P . Since there is only one stable matching in both P and P , every procedure which returns a 583 link-additive stable matching will return M 2 in P and M 1 in P , and thus it is strictly w-manipulable.
584
The example in the proof of the above theorem shows a very intuitive and dangerous manipulation 585 scheme: the manipulator sets a very high weight (higher than twice the highest of the other weights in the 586 profile) for its top choice. In this way, it will surely be matched to its top choice, no matter the procedure 587 used or the preferences of the other agents over the alternatives that are not their top choices.
588
This form of manipulation can be avoided by forcing the same weight for all top choices of all agents.
589
This restriction however does not prevent all forms of w-manipulation.
590
Theorem 7 If we restrict to profiles with the same weight for all top choices, every procedure that 591 returns a link-additive stable matching is w-manipulable, and there is at least one procedure which is 592 strictly w-manipulable.
593
Proof: Let {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 } and {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 } be, respectively, the set of women and men. Consider the 594 following instance of an SMW, P , {m 1 : w [7] 3 > w [6] 2 > w 3 > w [6] 2 > w 
614
We now show that not all the profiles of an SMW can be expressed as a problem Link(P ) for some P
615
and thus some classical forms of manipulation cannot be adopted in the context of link-based stability.
616
In particular, we will show that the profiles P and P which allowed Roth in [39] to state that 617 all the stable marriage procedures are manipulable cannot be used in our context to prove classical 618 manipulation, since there are no SMWs P and P such that P = Linka(P * ) and P = Linka(P * * ).
619
Theorem 8 Given an SM P , it may not be possible to find an SMW P * such that Linka(P * ) = P . that Linka(P ) = P * . Then, the following conditions must hold: (1) la(m 1 , w 2 ) > la(m 1 , w 1 ), (2) 624 la(m 3 , w 1 ) > la(m 3 , w 2 ), (3) la(m 1 , w 1 ) > la(m 3 , w 1 ), and (4) la(m 3 , w 2 ) > la(m 1 , w 2 ). This implies
have la(m 3 , w 2 ) > la(m 3 , w 2 ), which is a contradiction.
627
Notice that the theorem above holds indipendently from how the link of a pair is computed. Starting 628 from the above result, we can show that some classical forms of manipulation cannot be adopted in the 629 context of link-based stability.
630
Theorem 9 The SMs P and P which allowed Roth in [39] to state that all the stable marriage 631 procedures are manipulable cannot be used to show classical manipulation when we consider link-based 632 stability notions.
633
Proof: The SMs P and P considered in [39] are defined as follows. P coincides with the problem 634 considered in the proof of Theorem 8, and P is obtained by P , by replacing the preference of w 1 as 635 follows m 1 > m 2 > m 3 . P is the problem where w 1 misreports her preferences and she gets a better 636 result than the one obtained in P by telling the truth. In Theorem 8 we have shown that there is no 637 an SMW P * such that Linka(P * ) = P . Moreover, by using the same reasoning done in the proof of
638
Theorem 8 we can show that there is no an SMW P * * such that Linka(P * * ) = P . 
